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Emergence in Theological Perspective: A Corollary
to Professor Clayton’s Boyle Lecture1
NIELS HENRIK GREGERSEN
It is highly apposite that Philip Clayton has chosen the topic of emergence for his
Boyle Lecture 2006. Not only has our lecturer contributed substantially to the re-
establishment of emergentism as a safe and challenging middle way between
dualism and physicalist reductionism,2 Clayton has also highlighted aspects of
natural causation, which was already observed by Robert Boyle (1627 – 91), in
whose name the Boyle Lectures are given. Being one of the founders of modern
chemistry, Boyle was attentive to the appearance of novel qualities of material
configurations and repeatedly emphasized what has later become known to us as
whole-part-causation: ‘‘For we must consider each body, not barely as it is in itself,
an intire and distinct portion of matter, but as it is a part of the universe, and
consequently placed among a great number and variety of other bodies, upon
which it may act and by which it may be acted on in many ways . . . .’’3 It is no
coincidence, therefore, that the Oxford English Dictionary of English counts Boyle as
one of the very first to use the term ‘emergence.’4
From the clockwork to the network
Even though Robert Boyle was a firm proponent of a mechanical world-picture,
20th century scholarship has shown to what extent Robert Boyle’s atomic theory
of matter was dynamical in nature. No less a figure than the historian of science
Thomas Kuhn pointed out how Boyle’s ‘‘dynamical atomism’’ allowed him to
understand the universe as self-transformative so that the universe eventually is,
or rather becomes, what Boyle himself called a ‘‘self-moving machine.’’5 Chemistry,
for Boyle, was the study of mixed bodies above the level of the minimal corpuscles
(the minima). Boyle here observed that even the mixta prima (like gold) were not
stable, since primary compounds could also take part of new reaction cycles in
other contexts. What matters, after all, are not only the components but also the
constellations of matter. Here it is that both the term and the subject-matter of
emergence enters into the picture: in clusters of particles, says Boyle, when the
corpuscles lose their shape, size or motion, ‘‘each of them really ceases to be a
corpuscle of the same denomination it was before; and from the coalition of
these there may emerge a new body, as really one, as either of the corpuscles was
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before they were mingled, or if you please, confounded.’’6 There might eventually
be a shorter way from the clockwork picture of the universe that Boyle favored to
the network view of the world of nature that 20th century emergentism has
suggested to us.
But it should not be overlooked either, as rightly observed by Professor Clayton,
that the style of theological reasoning has changed significantly since the time of
the original Boyle Lectures between 1692 and 1732, initiated by Richard Bentley’s
famous Confutation of Atheism. After all, it is not atheism but the feasibility of an
out-and-out reductionism that is refuted by the emergentist paradigm. It is indeed
possible to fully accept the reality of qualitatively new and causally effective
structures in the world of nature (i.e. to adopt strong emergence), without thereby
embracing a broadly theistic account of our emergent universe. There is not, as
perhaps hoped for by Robert Boyle, a clear inference from the world of nature to
God, from the field of chemistry to the reality of a wise and caring creator. What
one can claim, however, is that the emergentist view of nature is highly congenial
with the a priori expectations that a believer in a creative and benevolent God
would have of the structure of the world of nature. It can even be argued that the
general thrust of evolution towards ever more complex forms of creatures—
adaptive, sensitive and communicative creatures—can best be accounted for from
a theistic perspective, as suggested by Clayton, especially if one is interested in a
comprehensive explanation of reality rather than confining oneself to causal
explanations of particulars. Therefore, what I would like to do here is to discuss, in
sympathetic agreement with Professor Clayton’s lecture, the importance of an
emergentist worldview for religious reflection, in particular for Christian theology.
Crudely said, is there a connection between the chemistry of emergence and the
emergence of Jesus Christ? Put more modestly, and more to the point, what are
the potential bearings of emergentism for a religious understanding of divine
grace or generosity?
The natural abode of emergent phenomena
Let me nonetheless begin with a short reflection on the limits of the idea of
emergence. Most concepts have a certain range of applicability, and this also
applies to the idea of emergence. Emergent phenomena are ubiquitous in an
evolving world, as rightly shown by Clayton, but emergent processes do not
happen unexpectedly. Prior to the interesting cases of emergence, there is a
physical universe that both affords and supports the appearance of qualitative
novelty.
Emergent processes, almost by definition, means emerging from, or growing
out of, something that is already established. It is not possible to imagine emergent
processes arising without a physical basis from which they take off and without an
appropriate milieu to sustain their development and flourishing. The fluidity of
water does not happen without the prior existence of oxygen and hydrogen
molecules, without the chemical bonding laws (which indeed can be reduced to
physical properties) and without the appropriate temperature. Similarly, birds do
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not flock without individual birds having the capacity to orient themselves in
relation to one another, and without specific environmental factors such as
temperature, aerodynamics, and other factors yet unknown to us.
These simple examples suffice to show that emergent properties do not rule out
reductionist explanation, since emergent processes build on persistent physical
and chemical structures that often have a nice and simple reductionist
explanation. Accordingly, the paradigm of emergentism cannot, and should not,
be used to weaken the quest for a reductionist causal analysis within physics,
chemistry, and biology, wherever applicable. What the paradigm of emergence
falsifies, if it is successful, is the claim of a thorough reductionism. Clayton rightly
insists on the necessity of explanations that take into account holistic features of
evolving systems. He also points to the importance of co-evolution as a prime
facilitator of new emergent phenomena, such as the co-evolution of the brain and
language. Emergentist explanations here always rest upon reductionist explana-
tions, but the emergentist paradigm is able to explain more, in so far as it
addresses the specific configurations or patterns in which new properties emerge
and new processes are propagated, often with startling causal effects. Emergentist
explanations here explain more than could be explained from the perspective of
microphysical determination, or from the perspective of a genes-alone view within
biology.7
Designed for emergence?
These observations also have some relevance for theology. For if emergent
processes are always arising on the basis of certain persistent background
conditions of a physical-chemical sort, and if emergent processes are always
conditioned by complex boundary conditions, theology should refrain from
contrasting self-organization and emergence on the one hand and the possibility
of design arguments on the other hand. It is possible to argue that the world of
nature is exactly designed for self-organization. At the very least, what we observe
from our own vantage point is that the physical world is a particularly fertile
milieu for emergent phenomena.8
Note, however, that this theological design argument only relates to the basic
constituents of matter, and to laws of nature reigning at the constituent level of
physics. The so-called Anthropic Principle asks what the relations are between
fundamental physics and the emergence of life on planet Earth (and perhaps
elsewhere in the universe). One here wonders: ‘‘Why is it that we have the kind of
matter we have (with a propensity for life), and why is it that we have laws of
physics which seem fine-tuned for the emergence and propagation of life.’’ In
addition to this meta-scientific question we can, as argued by the South African
cosmologist George Ellis, explore a correlative set of scientific questions: ‘‘How
much could the initial conditions of the universe differ from what they actually
are, and how much could the fundamental laws of physics be different, and we
would still have the emergence of life?’’ Since all life, that we know about is
carbon-based, and the route to the formation of carbon is highly contingent on the
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size of the universe (since carbon is formed in stars with the rare triple-alpha
reactions), the design hypothesis remains a strong candidate for truth. For sure,
we do not have a clear inference from laws of nature to design; but we do have a
plausible truth-candidate, which is fully as rational as competing explanations in
terms of ultimate chance (the Lady Luck-hypothesis) or the metaphysical
hypothesis of multiverses.9 Moreover, a higher-order hypothesis of a divine
design would be at least compatible with a notion of radical contingency, or with
the putative existence of multiverses, even though the design hypothesis would
then lose its rational superiority over against its rival explanations.10
Against this background, I would therefore argue that self-organization no less
than emergence can replace the explanatory function of the design argument
concerning the world’s basic framework. At this level, we might still follow Robert
Boyle’s intellectual confession, ‘‘I ascribe to the wisdom of God . . . the first fabric of
the universe . . .’’11 Far from being a formal argument of design, Boyle here makes
a practical inference, sitting on the stool of wonder while observing the high
degree of coordination within the physical cosmos.
Where emergence comes in, and design fails
Now, as Clayton reminds us, design arguments concerning specific biological systems
have indeed become obsolete after Darwin’s theory of evolution. In today’s
science, self-organization and natural selection do the job that earlier could only be
explained by appeals to special divine designs.12 The American Intelligent Design
Movement (ID) is, therefore, bound to fail, first because it speaks as if it were
possible to ‘‘detect design’’ from the appearance of ‘‘irreducible complexity’’ (a
move which most design theorists find unconvincing);13 second because it uses
gaps of current science to fill in God (or other designers); and third because it fails
to acknowledge the extent to which the processes of evolution use pre-adapted
structures for building up new structures for other adaptive purposes.14 I would
also argue that ID is theologically flawed for the simple reason that it presupposes
a fundamental contrast between the workings of nature, and God’s work as
creator.
I will therefore leave ID as it is and instead follow up upon Clayton’s
observation that emergence is closely linked to co-evolution. As is well known, the
idea of emergence came up in the safe climate of evolutionary thinking, as
epitomized in the British biologist C. Lloyd Morgan’s Emergent Evolution (1923).15
What still needs to be clarified in theoretical biology, however, is the relation
between the many cases of self-organization and emergence on the one hand, and
natural selection on the other hand. Is emergence the well-spring of a host of new
hopeful evolutionary candidates, which drive evolution, though always con-
strained by natural selection that determines which organisms have a future, and
which not? Or is it the other way around: that natural selection drives the course
of evolution, though always constrained by what is physically feasible? As argued
by David J Depew and Bruce H. Weber in Darwinism Evolving these issues remain
controversial within current biology.16 I find it most likely that one could find
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empirical cases for both alternatives.17 If so, this is a further plank in the argument
for strong emergence, as laid out by Clayton and others. For whether emergent
processes are mainly creative by feeding the game of selection with new hopeful
creatures, or by constraining the process of selection, emergent processes must be
accorded a strong status of being ‘‘real,’’ since they have long-range causal effects
in evolution.
Admittedly, in some cases of emergence, such as in the case of snowflakes, one
could argue that such constellations of matter, rich and diverse as they are, have
no bearing for the future. However, this would not be the case where emergent
processes are coupled with evolutionary stable structures that have a capacity not
only to replicate themselves but also to store information for later use. As soon as
memory comes into the play in evolution, learning also appears, and a new level
of emergence has been reached.18 In particular, this is the case for self-productive
or autopoietic systems that, once they have emerged, develop by utilizing their
own stored information systems. We find this new level perhaps at the level of
cells but at least at the level of immune systems that are self-selective in the
process of producing anti-bodies. Even more so do brains with associated
consciousness and human languages develop by autopoiesis, or self-prductivity.
From emergent properties to emergent persons
Up to this point, I have sometimes spoken about emergent properties, sometimes
about emergent processes. The difference may indeed be crucial, for mere
emergent properties do not necessarily have causal effects, unless they are part of
emergent processes of a physical nature. One example is the emergent qualia of
consciousness such as our perception of colors. It is in principle a thinkable
hypothesis, laid out some years ago by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind,
that human consciousness may be accorded a kind of reality status, since the first-
person perspective is a novel feature of the universe in addition to physical
descriptions of the universe, including ourselves, from a third-person perspective.
According to Chalmers, however, consciousness does not play any causal role;
there may just be a flow of consciousness running in us alongside our
physiological brain states. Consciousness and brain states are correlated ad hoc,
but according to Chalmers the current state of neuroscience cannot deal with the
‘‘hard problem’’ of consciousness: ‘‘Why is it that we at all have states of
consciousness?’’ Chalmers’ proposal is then, first, that we should face the hard
problem of consciousness (not pretending to have solved the problem of
consciousness by pointing to ad hoc-correlations between neuronal and psycho-
logical states). Second, that human consciousness plays no causal role in our
behavior; and third, that we may imagine a future science that will uncover the
fundamental psycho-physical laws that may really explain consciousness.19 The
fundamental problem with Chalmers’ intelligent thought experiment, as I see it, is
not only that he denies that brains actually cause consciousness (though perhaps
not conclusively), but also that he understands consciousness to make up a
separate world of its own, a secluded world of consciousness. Re-phrased in
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Clayton’s terms, Chalmers fails to realize that the emergent properties (or
‘‘naturally supervenient’’ states) of consciousness are features of biological agents,
which for sure are real-world physical organisms and do have causal effects. In
short, the emergent properties of consciousness are not free-floating, but reside in
emergent processes of a physiological nature.
The question is here, ‘‘What is it that emerges?’’ If it is only properties that
emerge, we may have only weak emergence, that is, emergence without
particularly novel causal powers. Water and snowflakes may be of this sort, as
consciousness is, on Chalmer’s account. However, if it is processes that emerge, the
emergent structures are part of the causal nexus that channels and selects between
physical options, such as in the case of digestive systems, where the structure of
the stomach decides the sorts of nutrition to absorb or expel. Finally, if biological
organisms or self-reflexive agents emerge during evolution, it is (Chalmers’ thought
experiment notwithstanding) hardly possible to deny that emergent organisms
exert a specific causal influence on their future.20 Even if it could be shown that a
sudden flickering brain state in a gander triggers the migration of geese, neither
the leading role of the gander, nor the flocking behavior of the geese, nor the goal-
oriented behavior of migration, say from Denmark to Greenland, could be
explained apart from the social patterns of learning and behavior which have
evolved over centuries in such specific geese populations. We do not call it a
‘‘migration pattern’’ merely as a nice shorthand for properties ‘‘in reality’’
governed by physical processes, nor do we understand the minds of birds as a
secluded world of its own. If we disregard the emergent level of learning behavior
at the level of bird populations, we simply cannot give a causal account of so
many kilos of physical stuff moving from Denmark to Svalbard, and to Greenland.
In addition, much more so with human consciousness. We are indeed, as noted
by Clayton, continuous with both our biological past and our contemporary
mammalian cousins. Yet we are also discontinuous. For human cultures,
presuppose the co-evolution of type-different systems, such as language (a cultural
system) and brains (a physiological system). As bio-cultural creatures, human
beings are able to produce new domains of creativity, such as complex human
societies, in which agents are able to deliberate and make informed choices about
what to do, how to do it, with whom to do it, and where to go. Human beings live in
their constrained natural habitats but also in an open horizon of developmental
possibilities to be explored.
The kind of language utilized by human beings is therefore unique in relation to
our mammalian peers. As argued by Terrence Deacon, our language is symbolic in
nature, in principle distinct from the signal language that we find among other
mammals.21 What we refer to in our languages are not only specific particulars,
like warning signals referring to specific sorts of predators; we refer also to
abstract realities such as ‘‘animals,’’ ‘‘country,’’ ‘‘money’’ or ‘‘love,’’ where only in
the process of communication do we specify, what we are referring to, while
retaining an open horizon of meaning. The expression ‘‘my love’’ can thus refer to
my wife, my child, my dog, my own love, or to divine love, all dependent on the
particular context. By using universals, we are also able to anticipate and respond
to potential states that are not yet made into reality. This we do routinely in
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planning activities, and we do it religiously when we attune ourselves to spiritual
realities, which are yet in the process of coming. ‘‘The time is fulfilled, and the
kingdom has come near, repent, and believe in the good news.’’ (Mark 1:14) This
saying of Jesus, the first saying reported in Gospel of Mark, addresses human
beings as whole persons, as agents in their own lives, as responsible for their
community, and as persons that are to attune themselves to the reality of the
kingdom of God (which only exists as a spiritual possibility). Human beings not
only live in a fixed physical environment, but in a symbolic world that comprises
both that which is seen and that which is yet unseen.
God as subject-and-verb
Now, how far can the idea of emergence be used in our language about God? It
seems to me that here again, we come to a limit in the use of the concept of
emergence in theology. I concur with Clayton that one should not expect too direct
a connection between emergent patterns in nature and our concept of God. If we
were to follow Samuel Alexander’s understanding of the world process as a
‘‘deisising’’ process, God would be the product, even a victim, of the cosmic
process. The distinctive character of God, as also expressed by Alexander, would
then be ‘‘lodged in only a portion of the Universe,’’ since the ‘‘distinctive character
of deity is not creative, but created.’’22
Put in grammatical terms: in the theistic traditions, both in India and in the
Abrahamic traditions, God always takes the position of the logical subject, that is,
the position of firstness, while a radical emergentist view of God places God in the
position of the predicate, that is, as the secondary one, while the material universe
would take the logical place of the subject. God would not be a reality
ontologically prior to the world, but the subsequent result of the world process,
in so far as the predicates of goodness and beauty are realized (they are not
everywhere). One could then speak of ‘‘the divine’’ (the predicate), but not about
God (the subject). This was also the position that Ludwig Feuerbach took in his
atheist critique of Christianity in The Essence of Christianity (1844). Here Feuerback
famously asked, ‘‘Who is actually our redeemer and reconciler? Is it God, or is it
Love? It is Love! For it is not God that has redeemed us but Love, which so loftily
transcends the difference between divine and human personality.’’23
By contrast, theistic traditions understand God as the eternal and everlasting
source of emergence. This fits with my earlier view that the world may be explained
as a fertile abode created by God for the purpose of self-organization and
emergence. In this view, God’s priority is retained. Then one might wonder: does
this mean that God the Creator stays aloof from the world, without any
connection to the world of creation other than that of being its designer and
initiator? In fact, this view can be found in Christian tradition, especially in the
tradition of natural theology. Here I would like to suggest that the idea of
emergence might prompt us to take leave of fabricator model of the creator that has
been part of standard philosophical theism. Rather, we should assume a more
artistic model of God being the artist, while the world of nature expresses of God’s
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eternal Light, Love, and Beauty. In this picture, there is no divide—and hence no
competition—between God’s creative activity and natural creativity, for the latter
is exactly the expression of the former.
Put in grammatical terms, God should not be conceived of as a solitary subject
standing above creation, but as the unity of the grammatical position of the
subject-clause and the verb: That which makes things happen. The emerging
reality of the world of creation, then, takes the logical role of the predicate, always
initiated by God (‘‘The Father’’), expressing God’s Logos (‘‘The Son’’) and being
enabled and embraced by God (‘‘The Spirit’’).
What needs to be added to this classic formulation of God’s ubiquity, however,
is a new emphasis of God playing not only the role of the active agent, but also
that of the receiver.24 This may be termed a ‘‘temporal theism,’’ that is, an
understanding of God as having both an eternal nature—as the everlasting Light,
Love, and Beauty—and a relation to time and the emergence of novelty. For the
God who genuinely loves the world also needs to understand the world and to
feel the world from the inside, from the first-person perspective of animal and
human existence. In order for God’s Love to be accomplished, God must be
empathetic and compassionate, yet without being dragged down by suffering.25
The point of departure for such a temporal theism is in Christianity the central
idea of incarnation. However, if a temporal God is not to be a victim of the world’s
suffering, the principle of divine firstness must be retained. As earlier, this puts
constraints to the theological use of the idea of emergence. Accordingly, classic
Christianity asserts that it is from the inner nature of God’s triune life that the
divine will to create and be part of creation arises. This is expressed in the notion
of divine kenosis, by which I here mean God’s self-determination to be part of
creation, and to take on the role of the creature, that is, also the logical position of
the predicate. However, in order not to be dragged down by the world’s suffering,
Orthodox Christianity also affirms that only the eternal Son or Logos of God
‘‘became flesh.’’ (John 1:14) By contrast, God, the heavenly Father, stands for the
everlastingly active pole in God, while the Holy Spirit in God’s triune life stands
for the constant perichoresis between Father and Son, including the interpenetra-
tion of the eternal nature of God and the flux of emergence and breakdown of
which the divine Logos takes part.
Jesus as emergent reality
This view of the God-world relation derives from the Christian interpretation of
the human person Jesus as Christ, as ‘‘the image of the invisible God, the firstborn
of all creation.’’ (Col 1:15.) However, the New Testament sources are complex, as
we know. We both find passages that describe Jesus as a fully human being and as
eternal Lord. In Paul we hear that Jesus was ‘‘born by a woman, born under the
law’’ (Gal 4:4) and similarly the gospel narratives depict Jesus as a child of the
history of the human religion; he is told to have entered the temple as a young boy
and was found by his parents ‘‘sitting among the teachers, listening to them and
asking them questions.’’ (Luke 2:46.) Yet, we hear the well-known stories of his
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wonderful birth: Jesus was conceived by the Holy Spirit and the power of the
Most High overshadowed Mary, his mother (Luke 1:34 – 35); likewise we hear
about the extraordinary authority of Jesus, and that he could say to his followers:
‘‘These words you hear are not my own; they belong to the father who sent me.’’
(John 14:24.)
Theologians have sometimes been divided on this issue. Should we choose the
more human formulations (as liberals tend to prefer), or should we choose the
more emphatic divine explanations of who Jesus really was (as conservatives
argue)? Since the 1960s, theological discussions on Christology have being
plagued by such easy contrasts between ‘‘Christologies from below’’ and
‘‘Christologies from above.’’
Where would a theology informed by emergentism place its priorities? A first
option is that an emergentist Christology simply uses the concept of emergence
and re-applies it to the particular historical figure of Jesus. Thus one might say that
Jesus is a new reality, emerging within the realm of a specific human civilization,
which itself has emerged from an animal heritage, which again has evolved from
the basic structure of life that once upon a time, some 4.5 billion years ago, arose
from inorganic matter. In effect, this would be an extended version of a
Christology from below.
On reflection, however, this solution is hardly advisable. For again we need to
remind ourselves about the endemic limits of the concept of emergence. For as we
saw above, emergent processes, by definition, grow out of something already
existing. As a matter of fact, emergent phenomena always need an appropriate
milieu in order to emerge. Taking the concept of emergence seriously means taking
seriously also the preconditions of emergent phenomena. What I want to argue
here is that what is the case in natural phenomena is also, by analogy, the case in
the human person of Jesus as Christ. Just as features of consciousness do not flow
unsupported by brains, and just as brains do not emerge apart from a suitable
biological organism, and just as biological organisms do not arise apart from a
physical world of regularities and basic physical laws, so Jesus cannot be said to be
the expression of God’s embracing love without God (one way or another) pre-
existing as a divine milieu of love. Accordingly, one should not prematurely
establish a contrast between an emergentist Christology ‘‘from below’’ and an
incarnational Logos-Christology ‘‘from above.’’ Rather, a more self-reflexive
version of an emergentist Christology might want to argue that in the radically
contingent life-story of Jesus, and in his poignant parables, it is exactly the eternal
life-story of God that was expressed, re-enacted or revealed, in the Jesus-story.
As is well known, the old Church decided at the Council of Chalcedon 451 to
stay with the conundrum: Jesus is ‘‘truly God and truly human.’’ Furthermore, it
was said that Jesus ‘‘is to be acknowledged in two natures, without confusion,
without change, without division, and without separation.’’ This so-called two-
natures doctrine may not be very helpful as a description of ‘‘two natures’’ in the
one person of Jesus.26 Nevertheless, the fundamental view that the genuine
human form of Christ is indistinguishable from the genuine divine expression in
Jesus seems inescapable from a logical point of view. What emerged in the
teaching of Jesus, and in his behavior towards his neighbors, is, as perceived from
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Christian belief, exactly the expression of the mind of God from the beginning. A
religious novelty, which emerged out of history and was lived out in the midst of
creation, was God’s Logos (‘‘Mind’’), Sophia (‘‘Wisdom’’), or Eikon (‘‘Image’’) from
old. Jesus not only spoke about God, but he was the realization of God’s Word to
humankind. Jesus not only referred to divine wisdom, but he was God’s Wisdom
in person. Jesus not only spoke about the Kingdom of God as a new emerging
reality, but he initiated the Kingdom around him and included human beings in
the reign of God.
In all these strands of scripture there is here no hint of a competition between
Jesus the Son of Man on earth and his heavenly Father. For the conviction of the
first Christians was, as Christians believe today, that Jesus at once was the re-
enactment of a divine purpose from old, and a radical novelty that broke with
tradition (while still using the reservoirs of religious wisdom, wherever fitful for
his purpose). The life history of Jesus was both seen as a new emergent reality, and
as an expression of the eternal Mind of God.
Conclusion
What I have proposed is that the idea of emergence loses its meaning if it is
applied in a too indiscriminate way. In the world of nature, emergent processes
take place in a physical and chemical setting, which is a friendly and supportive
abode for emergent processes to thrive. There must be an orderly and regular
world in order for novelty to take place, and there must exist highly fine-tuned
laws of nature in order for biological evolution to take place. In theology,
similarly, emergence should not be used as the key to all sorts of theological
questions. Following the cues of Professor Clayton, I have attempted to show that
a Christian theology of creation and incarnation is particularly pre-adapted for
absorbing important elements of the emergentist paradigm. In a temporal theism,
there are temporally emerging aspects even within God’s everlasting nature, and
in the doctrine of incarnation the humanity of Jesus is affirmed as an emergent
reality who was tapping both from the reservoir of religious traditions and from
the until then untapped resources of the emerging reality of the reign of God.
The common denominator between the doctrine of creation and Christology, as
proposed in this lecture, lies in the complex unity of creator and creature, of the
truly human and the truly divine. Just as the divine and the human cannot be
separated, nor should be confused, according to the Chalcedonian paradigm, so
the naturalness of creation should be affirmed as the prime expression of the
beauty and benevolence of God.
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